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Abstract 
We extend approval voting so as to elect multiple candidates, who may be either 
individuals or members of a political party, in rough proportion to their approval in the 
electorate.  We analyze two divisor methods of apportionment, first proposed by 
Jefferson and Webster, that iteratively depreciate the approval votes of voters who have 
one or more of their approved candidates already elected.  We compare the usual 
sequential version of these methods with a nonsequential version, which is 
computationally complex but feasible for many elections.  Whereas Webster 
apportionments tend to be more representative of the electorate than those of Jefferson, 
the latter, whose equally spaced vote thresholds for winning seats duplicate those of 
cumulative voting in 2-party elections, is even-handed or balanced. 
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1.  Introduction 
The properties of approval voting (AV)—whereby voters can vote for as many 
candidates as they like, and the candidate with the most votes wins—have been 
extensively studied in the case of single-winner elections (Brams and Fishburn, 1983; 
Brams, 2008; Laslier and Sanver, 2010).  Although AV has been and continues to be used 
in multiwinner elections (e.g., to elect members of the Council of the Game Theory 
Society), this usage has been questioned, because it enables a 51% majority, if it votes as 
a bloc for all of its preferred candidates, to win all the seats on a committee or council, 
leaving the 49% minority unrepresented.  
To address this problem, alternative ways of aggregating approval votes have 
been proposed to better represent factions in the electorate roughly proportionally to their 
approval.  For example, Brams, Kilgour, and Sanver (2007) analyzed a “minimax 
procedure,” which chooses the committee that minimizes the maximum Hamming 
distance to the ballots, weighted by their proximity to other voters’ ballots.  They applied 
this procedure to the 2003 election of the Game Theory Society Council and analyzed 
differences between the 12 candidates elected under AV and the 12 that would have been 
elected under the minimax procedure.  For a generalization of this approach, see 
Sivarajan (2016).   
Several other ways of aggregating approval ballots have been analyzed, including 
“satisfaction approval voting” (Brams and Kilgour, 2014), which maximizes the sum of 
voters’ satisfaction scores, defined as the fraction of the approved candidates who are 
elected.  Another approach, first proposed by Monroe (1995), and generalized by Potthoff 
and Brams (1998) using integer programming, minimizes voters’ dissatisfaction, which 
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can be based on approval votes.  Brams (1990, 2008, ch. 4) analyzed “constrained 
approval voting,” in which winners are determined by both their vote shares and the 
categories of voters who approve of them, with constraints put on the numbers that can be 
elected from different categories.     
Kilgour, Brams, and Sanver (2006), Kilgour (2010), Kilgour and Marshall (2012), 
and Elkind, Faliszewski, Skowron, and Slinko (2017) review a variety of methods for 
electing committees using approval ballots.  A number of analysts (Sánches-Fernández, 
Fernández Garcia, and Fisteus, 2016; Subiza and Peris, 2014; Brill, Laslier, and Skowron, 
2016) have suggested using divisor methods of apportionment (more on these methods 
later) as a basis for selecting multiple winners.  We adopt this approach here, addressing, 
among other topics, the representativeness of the candidates that different versions of 
these methods elect, which previous studies have not analyzed.         
We focus on the use of weights from two most prominent divisor methods of 
apportionment (Balinski and Young, 1982/2001; Pukelsheim, 2014), one of which was 
independently proposed by Thomas Jefferson and Viktor d’Hondt, the other by Daniel 
Webster and André Saint-Laguë.  We identify them by the surnames of their American 
discoverers (Jefferson and Webster), because their discoveries preceded those of their 
European discoverers. 
The standard Jefferson and Webster methods are based on iterative procedures, 
whereby winners are determined sequentially until a body of requisite size is obtained.  
With approval ballots, if the candidates are individuals, then once a candidate is elected, 
the method is applied to the remaining unelected candidates in order to fill the desired 
number of seats.  If the candidates are not individuals but instead political parties, then 
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these methods determine the numbers of seats in a legislature or other body that each 
party receives (if any).1   
Each of these methods has a nonsequential analogue, which is not used in practice 
and may produce different, even disjoint, winners from those of the sequential version.  
We ask whether the nonsequential winners are more representative than sequential 
winners: Do more voters approve of one or more of the nonsequential winners than the 
sequential winners?2  We also ask whether the Webster winners (both sequential and 
nonsequential) are more representative than the Jefferson winners. 
We next turn from the election of individual candidates to the election of different 
numbers of candidates from political parties.  We show that Webster tends to choose a 
member of a relatively small party before choosing an additional member of a larger 
political party, thereby giving more voters at least one representative, whereas Jefferson 
has the opposite tendency. 
If there are only two candidates or political parties, we assume that voters prefer, 
and vote for, only one.  Thus, the opportunity afforded by an approval ballot—of 
approving of more than one candidate or party—is irrelevant in the 2-candidate or 2-party 
case.  
For approval balloting with more than two parties or candidates, it turns out that 
vote thresholds for electing one or more candidates under Jefferson coincide with those 
                                                
1 In lieu of determining apportionments sequentially, one can search for a divisor which, when divided into 
the vote shares of political parties, yields the number of seats—after some kind of rounding—that each 
party will receive in the legislature.  The Jefferson method rounds down the exact entitlements (later called 
“quotas”) of the parties, which are not typically integers, whereas the Webster method rounds in the usual 
manner (rounding up the exact entitlement if its remainder is equal to or greater than 0.5, rounding down 
otherwise).  For details, see Balinski and Young (1982/2001).    
2 A downside to the nonsequential versions of the apportionment methods is that they are computationally 
complex, not implementable in polynomial time (Brill, Laslier, and Skowron, 2016). 
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for cumulative voting, but Jefferson does not require that parties nominate only as many 
candidates as are commensurate with their approval totals in order to ensure proportional 
representation.  The thresholds for Jefferson are equally spaced, which renders them 
even-handed or balanced compared with the unequally spaced Webster thresholds.     
In elections in which voters can vote for only one candidate or party, the Jefferson 
and Webster apportionment methods satisfy several desirable properties (Balinski and 
Young, 1982, 2001), but they are not flawless.  Like all divisor apportionment methods, 
they are vulnerable to manipulation; furthermore, they may not always give political 
parties the number of representatives to which they are entitled after rounding (either up 
or down).   
Nevertheless, these methods seem the best possible way not only to elect single 
winners but also to elect multiple winners, using approval ballots.  By expressing their 
support for sets of candidates that cross ideological or party lines, voters may ultimately 
diminish the gridlock one sees in voting bodies, especially in the United States.    
2.  The Jefferson and Webster Methods Applied to Candidates  
The development and use of apportionment methods has a rich history.  It is 
recounted in the American case by Balinski and Young (1982/2001), wherein the best-
known application has been to the apportionment of members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives to states according on their populations.  In the European case, these 
methods have been applied to the apportionment of seats to political parties in a 
parliament according to the numbers of votes they receive in an election (Pukelsheim, 
2014).  In both of these applications, the methods determine how many seats each state, 
or each party, receives, respectively, in the House of Representatives or in the parliament.   
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Other jurisdictions in the United States,3 and parliaments around the world, 
especially in Europe, use divisor methods of apportionment, of which there are exactly 
five that lead to stable apportionments: No transfer of a seat from one state or party to 
another can produce less disparity in apportionment, where “disparity” is measured in 
five different ways (there are other ways of measuring disparity, but they do not produce 
stable apportionments using a divisor method).  Two of the five ways of defining 
disparity are given by the Jefferson and Webster methods, which we describe next.4   
Though originally devised for allocating seats to parties, based on votes, or to 
states, based on population, apportionment methods can also be used to allocate seats to 
select individual candidates based on a set of approval ballots.  In this role, they 
iteratively depreciate the value of a voter’s approvals as more and more of his or her 
approved candidates are elected.  More specifically, the sequential versions of these 
methods, which are the standard ones, give one seat, on each round, to the candidate, i, 
who maximizes a deservingness function, d(i).   
Let  denote the set of ballots, and let B(i) ⊆    denote the set of ballots that 
include an approval vote for candidate i.  On any round, let a(b) denote the number of 
                                                
3 This includes ten states that use multimember districts in the apportionment of their legislatures 
(https://ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_chambers_that_use_multi-member_districts). 
4 The Webster method is used in four Scandinavian countries, whereas the Jefferson method is used in 
eight other countries.  None of the other three divisor methods is currently used, except for Hill for the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  The nondivisor Hamilton method, also called “largest remainders,” is used in 
nine countries (Blais and Massicotte, 2002; Cox, 1997).  For a review of apportionment methods, see 
Edelman (2006a), who proposed a nondivisor method that is mathematized in Edelman (2006b).  In section 
4, we will say more about why we favor the Jefferson and Webster methods for allocating seats to political 
parties in a parliament. 
β β
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candidates mentioned on ballot b who are already elected.  The deservingness functions 
of the sequential versions of Jefferson (J) and Webster (W) are5 
 
. 
Simply put, on any round, each approval ballot supporting unelected candidate i is 
depreciated by an amount that reflects the number of already elected candidates 
mentioned on the ballot.  
On the first round, no candidate has yet received a seat, so a(b) = 0; for every 
ballot, the Jefferson fraction equals 1 and the Webster fraction equals 2.  Thus, the first 
candidate elected, according to both methods, will be the candidate who obtains the 
maximum number of approvals, or the AV winner.  The following example shows that 
the two methods may produce different winners, beginning in the second round.   
Example 1.  2 of 4 candidates {A, B, C, D} to be elected.  The numbers of voters 
who approve of different subsets of candidates are 
2: A  5: AB  3: AC   2: BC  4: D. 
A, B, C, and D receive, respectively, 10, 7, 5, and 4 approvals, so A is the candidate 
elected first.  For Jefferson on the second round, B’s ballots (the 5 supporting AB, and the 
                                                
5 The deservingness functions of the three other divisor methods are defined similarly.  The denominators 
of the summands are [a(b)(a(b)+1)]1/2 for Hill or “equal proportions,” 2a(b)[a(b)+1]/[2a(b)+1] for Dean or 
“harmonic mean,” and simply a(b) for Adams or “smallest divisors” (Balinski and Young, 1982/2001; 
Pukelsheim, 2014). 
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2 supporting BC) are counted as follows: a(b) = 1/2 for each of the 5 AB ballots, and a(b) 
= 1 for each of the 2 BC ballots. Thus, on the second round, B’s deservingness score is 
B: 5 × (1/2) + 2 × (1) = 4 1/2. 
Similarly, on the second round the deservingness scores of C and D are  
C: 3 × (1/2) + 2 × (1) = 3 1/2;     D: 4 × (1) = 4, 
so the second-round winner is B. 
 For Webster on the second round, B’s ballots (the 5 supporting AB, and the 2 
supporting BC) are counted as follows: a(b) = 2/3 for each of the 5 AB ballots, and a(b) = 
2 for each of the 2 BC ballots. Thus, on the second round, B’s deservingness score is 
B: 5 × (2/3) + 2 × (2) = 7 1/3. 
Similarly, on the second round the deservingness scores of C and D are  
C: 3 × (2/3) + 2 × (2) = 6;     D: 4 × (2) = 8, 
so the second-round winner is D.  To summarize Example 1, Jefferson elects AB and 
Webster elects AD. 
Notice the difference in the sequences of fractions that are added to determine 
deservingness scores under Jefferson and Webster.  As a(b) increases, for Jefferson 
1/[a(b) + 1] decreases according to the sequence 
1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 1/5, …, 
whereas for Webster 1/[a(b) + 1/2]  decreases according to the sequence 
 10 
2, 2/3, 2/5, 2/7, 2/9, …, 
or, equivalently,  
1, 1/3, 1/5, 1/7, 1/9, …. 
Later we generalize these sequences to the h-sequence, defined by 
1, ℎℎ + 1 , ℎℎ + 2 , ℎℎ + 3 ,⋯ 
where h ≥ 0.  Note that setting h = 1 produces the Jefferson sequence and h = ½ produces 
the Webster sequence. 
For both methods, the contributions of voters to deservingness scores are 
depreciated more and more as candidates whom they approve are elected.  But as can be 
seen by comparing the corresponding fractions in the Jefferson sequence and the Webster 
sequence (which is normalized to start at 1), candidates who approve of the AV winner—
and subsequent candidates who may be elected on later rounds—are less depreciated 
under the Jefferson method than under the Webster method.  This means that the 
Jefferson method more than the Webster method tends to favor candidates (e.g., B) whose 
voters have approved of a candidate already elected (e.g., A) than candidates (e.g., D) 
whose voters have not yet had an approved candidate elected. 
The same sequences can be used as the basis for a nonsequential method of 
committee election.  In a nonsequential method, each possible committee is assigned a 
score measuring the total satisfaction that it would deliver to voters; any committee with 
a maximum score wins.  Assuming there are n candidates and a committee of size m < n  
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is to be elected, there are  possible committees to be compared.  Denote the set of 
all possible committees by .   
To construct a nonsequential rule from any h-sequence, we measure the 
satisfaction of having one candidate elected as 1, the satisfaction of having two 
candidates elected as 1+    !!!!, the satisfaction from three candidates as 1+ !!!! + !!!!, 
etc. The Jefferson (J) and Webster (W) nonsequential scores for a committee C ∈  are 
obtained by setting h = 1 and h = ½, respectively:   
 
, 
where vk(C) is the number of voters who approve of exactly k members of C.6  Formally, 
. 
                                                
6 Notice in the parenthetic expressions that 1, and the fractions that follow are decreasing (e.g., from 1 to 
1/2 under Jefferson, from 1 to 1/3 under Webster, for voters who have more than one candidate approved). 
Thus, as with the sequential versions of each method, getting a second approved candidate elected does not 
come close to doubling a voter’s satisfaction over electing the first.  It is important to point out, however, 
that Jefferson and Webster never proposed the weighting sequences, based on the deservingness functions, 
given by the decreasing fractions.  (In addition, because a voter can reside in only one state, he or she can 
be counted only for that state, whereas with approval voting, a voter can vote for more than one candidate 
or party.)  Instead of weighting sequences, they proposed divisors that determine, after rounding, the 
numbers of seats that states are entitled to in the U.S. House of Representatives.  For more on the history of 
using weighted sequences in apportionment, which can be traced back to the late 19th century, see Brill, 
Laslier, and Skowron (2016).  What we call the sequential and nonsequential versions of the Jefferson 
method, in particular, are referred to in the literature as sequential proportional approval voting (SPAV) and 
proportional approval voting (PAV).  Aziz, Brill, Conitzer, Elkind, Freeman, and Walsh (2017) show that 
PAV but not SPAV satisfies “justified representation” and “extended justified representation,” but SPAV 
may be more “representative” than PAV, as we show in section 4.      
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where V is the set of all voters, and Bj is the ballot (set of approved candidates) of voter j.  
Of course, the C’s that maximize sJ(C) and sW(C) are the ones chosen by each method. 
We illustrate the Jefferson method in Example 1:  
2: A  5: AB  3: AC   2: BC  4: D. 
For the subset AB, v2(AB) = 5 voters approve of both A and B and v1(AB) = 7 voters 
approve of exactly one of A and B, with 5 approving of A but not B and 2 approving of B 
but not A.  Thus,  
sJ(AB) = 5 × (1 + 1/2) + 7 × (1) = 14 1/2;     sW(AB) = 5 × (1 + 1/3) + 7 × (1) = 13 2/3. 
For each of the six possible committees, we can calculate the v1 and v2 counts and, from 
them, the committee’s scores according to Jefferson (J) [in the format v2 × (3/2) + v1 × 
(1)] and Webster (W) [in the format v2 × (4/3) + v1 × (1)], as shown below:    
J:     sJ(AB) = 5 × (3/2) + 7 × (1) = 14 1/2;     sJ(AC) = 3 × (3/2) + 9 × (1) = 13 1/2;  
sJ(AD) = 0 × (3/2) + 14 × (1) = 14;      sJ(BC) = 2 × (3/2) + 8 × (1) = 11;  
sJ(BD) = 0 × (3/2) + 11 × (1) = 11;    sJ(CD) = 0 × (3/2) + 9 × (1) = 9. 
W:   sW(AB) = 5 × (4/3) + 7 × (1) = 13 2/3;     sW(AC) = 3 × (4/3) + 9 × (1) = 13;  
sW(AD) = 0 × (4/3) + 14 × (1) = 14;     sW(BC) = 2 × (4/3) + 8 × (1) = 10 2/3;  
sW(BD) = 0 × (4/3) + 11 × (1) = 11;     sW(CD) = 0 × (4/3) + 9 × (1) = 9. 
As the underscored maxima indicate, the nonsequential versions of Jefferson and Webster 
choose the same committees (AB for Jefferson, AD for Webster) as the sequential 
versions.  But this is not always the case. 
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Proposition 1.  The sequential and nonsequential versions of Jefferson or of 
Webster may elect different committees, which may have no overlap. 
Proof.  We start with a simple example in which there is partial overlap. 
Example 2.  2 of 3 candidates {A, B, C} to be elected.  The numbers of voters 
who approve of different subsets of candidates are  
7: AB          6: AC          4: B          4: C. 
A, B, and C receive, respectively, 13, 11, and 10 approvals, so A is the candidate elected 
first under sequential Jefferson.  On the second round, the deservingness scores for B and 
C are  
B: 7 × (1/2) + 4 × (1)  = 7 1/2;     C: 6 × (1/2) + 4 × (1) = 7, 
so AB wins.  Under nonsequential Jefferson, the satisfaction scores of the three pairs of 
candidates are 
AB: 7 × (3/2) + 10 × (1) = 20 1/2;     AC: 6 × (3/2) + 11 × (1) = 20; 
BC: 0 × (3/2) + 21 × (1) = 21, 
so BC wins (and A, the AV winner, is excluded).  Under Webster, the sequential and 
nonsequential winners are the same as under Jefferson. 
The sequential and nonsequential winners are disjoint in the following example: 
Example 3.7  2 of 4 candidates {A, B, C, D} to be elected.  The numbers of voters 
who approve of different subsets of candidates are 
                                                
7 Both this example and Example 4 in section 3 were found using an integer program. 
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1: AB          4: AC          4: AD          1: B          1: BC          4: BD          3: C. 
A, B, C, and D receive, respectively, 9, 7, 8, and 8 approvals.  Thus, A is the candidate 
elected first under sequential Jefferson.  On the second round, the candidates’ 
deservingness scores are  
B: 1 × (1/2) + 6 × (1) = 6 1/2;          C:  4 × (1/2) + 4 × (1) = 6; 
D: 4 × (1/2) + 4 × (1) = 6, 
so AB is the winning pair.  Under nonsequential Jefferson, the satisfaction scores of the 
six pairs of candidates are 
AB: 1 × (3/2) + 14 × (1) = 15 1/2;      AC: 4 × (3/2) + 9 × (1) = 15; 
AD: 4 × (3/2) + 9 × (1) = 15;      BC: 1 × (3/2) + 13 × (1) = 14 1/2; 
BD: 4 × (3/2) + 7 × (1) = 13;      CD: 0 × (3/2) + 16 × (1)  = 16,   
so CD is the winning pair, which does not overlap AB.  Under Webster, the sequential 
and nonsequential winners are the same as under Jefferson. n  
The fact that the sequential apportionment methods start by choosing the AV 
winner is the reason why they fail, in both Examples 2 and 3, to find the committee that 
maximizes the satisfaction of all voters, which excludes the AV winner.  If they had 
started with one member of the maximizing committee, they would have found the other. 
As noted in section 1, the nonsequential versions of Jefferson and Webster are 
computationally complex.  However, if the committee (or council) size is small, and the 
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number of candidates is not much larger, then the calculation of satisfaction scores for all 
committees is certainly feasible with modern computers.  
3.  Representativeness of a Voting Body 
While it is desirable that as many voters as possible be represented by at least one 
candidate they approve of on the committee, it is also desirable that voters who approve 
of the same or similar subsets of candidates get them elected in numbers roughly 
proportional to the numbers of voters who approve of them.  Different election 
procedures, including sequential and nonsequential Jefferson and Webster, may clash on 
these criteria. 
Examples 2 and 3 illustrate this clash in the case of both the Jefferson and 
Webster apportionment methods.  In Example 2, both versions of these methods elect B, 
but the sequential version first elects A (the AV winner), and only then B, making AB the 
winning pair, whereas the nonsequential version elects BC.  BC gives all 21 voters one 
approved member of the committee, whereas AC gives 6 voters two approved members 
and 11 voters one approved member (in total, 17 voters have at least one approved 
member), but 4 voters approve of no member.   
The clash between these criteria is also evident in Example 3, wherein the 
sequential versions of Jefferson and Webster choose AB and the simultaneous versions 
choose CD.  CD provides 16 of the 18 voters with at least one approved committee 
member, whereas AB provides only 15 voters with at least one approved member. 
Recall that the nonsequential version of each procedure compares all possible 
committees on the basis of the satisfaction that they give to voters, with satisfaction 
decreasing as additional approved candidates are elected.  The sequential version starts 
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by electing the AV winner (A in both Examples 2 and 3), who is not even a member of 
the nonsequential version’s winning pair in either case.  
We define the representativeness of a committee to be the number of voters who 
approve of at least one member of that committee.  This makes BC more representative 
than AB or AC in Example 2, and CD more representative than AB in Example 3.  In 
these examples, as we showed, nonsequential Jefferson and Webster produce more 
representative committees than their sequential counterparts.  But this is not always the 
case.    
Representativeness is not a new concept, although the idea that electoral methods 
might have different tendencies toward representativeness is.  Representativeness is the 
REP-1 scoring procedure proposed by Kilgour and Marshall (2012), which is also known 
as the Chamberlin-Courant (1983) procedure.  In Generalized Approval Voting, the score 
of a subset is the sum over all voters of a measure of the worth of the subset to the voter 
that depends only on the number of candidates in the subset that the voter supports 
(Kilgour and Marshall, 2012).  In fact, representativeness, nonsequential Jefferson scores, 
and nonsequential Webster scores are all generalized approval scores. 
The Generalized Approval score is   
S(C) = r1 v1(C) + r2 v2(C)  + r3 v3(C)  + … 
for any committee, C ∈ , where r1, r2, r3, … is a rep sequence that characterizes the 
procedure.  Thus, the score of subset C, S(C), is a sum of contributions from the voters: 0 
for voters who did not support any candidate in C; r1 for each voter who supported one 
candidate in C; r2 for each voter who supported two candidates in C; etc.  In particular, an 
Ω
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h-sequence corresponds to a rep sequence defined by r1 = 1 and, for J = 2, 3, 4, …,     𝑟! = 1+ !!!!!!!!!! .  Therefore, nonsequential Jefferson and Webster are Generalized 
Approval procedures, based on, respectively, the rep sequences 
Jefferson: r1 = 1, r2 = 1 + 1/2, r3 = 1 + 1/2 + 1/3, … 
Webster: r1 = 1, r2 = 1 + 1/3, r3 = 1 + 1/3 + 1/5, …. 
Because R(C) = v1(C) + v2(C) + v3(C) + … gives the number of voters who approve of at 
least one candidate in C, representativeness is measured by the score under the rep 
sequence corresponding to h = 0,  
   Representativeness: r1 = 1, r2 = 1, r3 = 1, …, 
Proposition 2.  If the sequential or nonsequential versions of Jefferson or 
Webster elect different committees, either the sequential or nonsequential committee may 
be more representative. 
Proof.  Examples 2 and 3 demonstrated that the nonsequential committees 
elected by Jefferson and Webster are more representative than the sequential committees.  
Example 4 shows the opposite.  
Example 4.  2 of 4 candidates {A, B, C, D} to be elected.  The numbers of voters 
who approve of different subsets of candidates are 
21: AC          21: AD          21: B          9: BD          9: C          10: CD. 
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A, B, C, and D receive, respectively, 42, 30, 40, and 40 approvals.  Thus, A is the 
candidate elected first under sequential Jefferson.  On the second round, the 
deservingness scores are  
B: 30 × (1) = 30;     C:  19 × (1) + 21 × (1/2) = 29 1/2; 
D: 19 × (1) + 21 × (1/2) = 29 1/2, 
so AB is the winning pair.  Under nonsequential Jefferson, the satisfaction scores of the 
six pairs of candidates are 
AB: 0 × (3/2) + 72 × (1) = 72;     AC: 21 × (3/2) + 40 × (1) = 71 1/2; 
AD: 21 × (3/2) + 40 × (1) = 71 1/2;     BC: 0 × (3/2) + 70 × (1) = 70; 
BD: 9 × (3/2) + 51 × (1) = 65 1/2;     CD: 10 × (3/2) + 60 × (1) = 75,   
so CD is the winning pair, which does not overlap AB.  Under Webster, the sequential 
and nonsequential winners are the same as under Jefferson. 
Observe that AB represents v1(AB) + v2(AB) = 0 + 72 = 72 of the 91 voters, 
whereas CD represents v1(CD) + v2(CD) = 10 + 60 = 70, so AB, the winner under 
sequential Jefferson, is more representative than CD, the winner under nonsequential 
Jefferson, exactly opposite to Example 3.  Thus, neither the sequential nor the 
nonsequential versions of Jefferson and Webster invariably produce more representative 
committees. n  
While the nonsequential version of each apportionment method produced the 
most representative 2-candidate committees in Examples 2 and 3, it was the sequential 
version in Example 4 that did so.  But when either the sequential or nonsequential version 
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of Jefferson or Webster gives a more representative committee, is that version the one 
that should be chosen?   
Not necessarily.  One important principle is that the method of vote aggregation 
should be known in advance.  From the calculations we have made so far, it seems that 
the nonsequential outcome is more likely to be more representative than the sequential 
outcome when the two differ, so we recommend the nonsequential method if it is 
feasible.  With it, one can rest assured that (by definition) one finds the committee that 
maximizes voter satisfaction; by contrast, the sequential committee must include the AV 
winner, a restriction that sometimes, but not always, reduces representativeness.8       
It is important to point out that neither the sequential nor the nonsequential 
committees may be the most representative possible, because both Jefferson and Webster 
take into account the level of support of the candidates.  This may prevent either method 
from choosing the set of candidates that is most representative, as our next example 
demonstrates.  
Example 5.  2 of 3 candidates {A, B, C} to be elected.  The number of voters who 
approve of different subsets of candidates are 
4: AB;     1: C. 
The most representative committees are AC and BC, representing all 5 voters, but both 
the sequential and nonsequential versions of both Jefferson and Webster choose AB, so 
the C voter is unrepresented.  Clearly, the 4 voters supporting AB prevent C, with support 
                                                
8 We have not attempted to compute how often, on average, this would occur, but a computer simulation 
would shed light on this question.   
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from only one voter, from winning a seat under either version of both Jefferson and 
Webster.    
What if there were 3 AB voters instead of 4, holding constant the 1 C voter?  
Whereas both sequential and nonsequential Jefferson still give AB an edge over AC and 
BC, both sequential and nonsequential Webster produce a 3-way tie among AB, AC, and 
BC.  Thus, not only do Jefferson and Webster give different outcomes, but two of the 
three outcomes given by sequential and nonsequential Webster (AC and BC) are more 
representative than the unique outcome (AB) given by sequential and nonsequential 
Jefferson.    
Example 1 also illustrates that outcomes produced by Webster may be more 
representative than those produced by Jefferson: Sequential Jefferson elects AB, 
representing 12 of the 16 voters, whereas sequential Webster elects AD, representing 14 
out of 16.  Nonsequential versions of each method yield the same outcomes, suggesting 
that Webster gives at least as representative, and sometimes more representative, 
outcomes than Jefferson for both the sequential and nonsequential versions of each 
method.  But this is not always true.  
Proposition 3.  For committees of size 2 elected by the nonsequential versions of 
Jefferson and Webster, the Webster committee is equally or more representative.  The 
same is true for the sequential versions if one candidate is the unique approval winner.  
But for larger committees for both the nonsequential and the sequential version, either 
the Jefferson or the Webster committee may be more representative.   
Proof.  For a committee of size 2, the nonsequential score corresponding to an h–
sequence is  
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𝑆! 𝐶 = 𝑣! 𝐶 + 1+ ℎℎ + 1 𝑣! 𝐶 = 𝑅 𝐶 + ℎℎ + 1 𝑣! 𝐶 . 
For any h** > h* > 0, suppose that Sh**(C) is maximized by C = C** and Sh*(C) is 
maximized by C = C*.  Then Sh**(C**) ≥ Sh**(C*) and Sh*(C*) ≥ Sh*(C**) imply, 
respectively, that  ℎ∗∗ + 1ℎ∗∗ 𝑅 𝐶∗ − 𝑅 𝐶∗∗ ≤ 𝑣! 𝐶∗∗ − 𝑣! 𝐶∗  
and 
𝑣! 𝐶∗∗ − 𝑣! 𝐶∗ ≤ ℎ∗ + 1ℎ∗ 𝑅 𝐶∗ − 𝑅 𝐶∗∗ . 
It follows that !!∗ − !!∗∗ 𝑅 𝐶∗ − 𝑅 𝐶∗∗ ≥ 0,  which establishes that R(C*) ≥ R(C**), 
since h** > h*.  In particular, the nonsequential Webster committee (h* = ½) must be at 
least as representative as the Jefferson committee (h* = 1). 
In the sequential case, the two procedures based on h** and h* (where h** > h* 
> 0) produce the same first-round winner, A, because (by assumption) there is no tie for 
approval-vote winner.  We focus on three candidates, A, B, and C, and suppose that A is 
the approval winner and that, in the second stage, B is more deserving than C according 
to h**, but C is more deserving than B according to h*.  We then show that AC must be a 
more representative committee than AB.  In particular, it may be the case that the winning 
committee based on h** is AB, whereas the one based on h* is AC. 
For any subset S  ⊆ {A, B, C}, let n(S) denote the number of voters who voted 
exactly for S plus, perhaps, some candidates other than A, B, and C.  Thus, n(A) is the 
total number of voters who voted for A but not B or C.  Similarly, n(ABC) is the number 
of voters who voted for all of A, B, and C, and n(∅) is the number of voters who voted for 
none of A, B, and C. 
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Our suppositions imply that  ℎ∗∗ℎ∗∗ + 1 𝑛 𝐴𝐵 + 𝑛 𝐴𝐵𝐶 + 𝑛 𝐵 + 𝑛 𝐵𝐶
≥ ℎ∗∗ℎ∗∗ + 1 𝑛 𝐴𝐶 + 𝑛 𝐴𝐵𝐶 + 𝑛 𝐶 + 𝑛 𝐵𝐶  
and that ℎ∗ℎ∗ + 1 𝑛 𝐴𝐵 + 𝑛 𝐴𝐵𝐶 + 𝑛 𝐵 + 𝑛 𝐵𝐶
≤ ℎ∗ℎ∗ + 1 𝑛 𝐴𝐶 + 𝑛 𝐴𝐵𝐶 + 𝑛 𝐶 + 𝑛 𝐵𝐶 . 
It follows that  
ℎ∗∗ + 1ℎ∗∗ 𝑛 𝐶 − 𝑛 𝐵 ≤ 𝑛 𝐴𝐵 − 𝑛 𝐴𝐶 ≤ ℎ∗ + 1ℎ∗ 𝑛 𝐶 − 𝑛 𝐵 . 
Thus, !!∗ − !!∗∗ 𝑛 𝐶 − 𝑛 𝐵 ≥ 0,  which, because h** > h*, establishes that n(C) − 
n(B) ≥ 0. 
The representativeness of the two subsets, AB and AC, is given by 
R AB n ABC n AB n AC n BC n A n B( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= + + + + +  
R AC n ABC n AB n AC n BC n A n C( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= + + + + + . 
Subtraction of these equations yields 
R(AC) − R(AB) = n(C) −n(B), 
which is non-negative from the previous paragraph.  It follows that the sequential 
committee based on h* can be no less representative than the sequential committee based 
on h**.  In particular, the sequential Webster committee (h* = ½) must be at least as 
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representative as the Jefferson committee (h* = 1).  
For larger committees, Example 6 below shows that it is possible for a Jefferson 
committee to be more representative than a Webster committee under both the sequential 
and non-sequential procedures. n  
The following example shows that Proposition 3 does not extend to committees of 
size greater than 2.   
Example 6.  3 of 4 candidates {A, B, C, D} to be elected.  The numbers of voters 
who approve of different subsets of candidates are 
1: A          12: C         186: AD          186: BD          540: ABC. 
For each of the four possible committees, we sum, going from left to right, the products 
of the number of voters in each subset and the sum of their rep sequences.  For example, 
for the 540 ABC voters, if the committee elected under Jefferson comprises all three of 
their approved candidates, we multiply 540 by the sum of their rep sequence, 1 + 1/2 + 
1/3 = 11/6.  For nonsequential Jefferson and Webster, we have the following approval 
scores:    
Jefferson:     
ABC: 1(1) + 12(1) + 186(1) + 186(1) + 540(11/6) = 1375 
ABD: 1(1) + 12(0) + 186(3/2) + 186(3/2) + 540(3/2) = 1369 
ACD: 1(1) + 12(1) + 186(3/2) + 186(1) + 540(3/2) = 1288 
BCD: 1(0) + 12(1) + 186(1) + 186(3/2) + 540(3/2) = 1287. 
Webster: 
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ABC: 1(1) + 12(1) + 186(1) + 186(1) + 540(23/15) = 1213 
ABD: 1(1) + 12(0) + 186(4/3) + 186(4/3) + 540(4/3) = 1217 
ACD: 1(1) + 12(1) + 186(4/3) + 186(1) + 540(4/3) = 1167 
BCD: 1(0) + 12(1) + 186(1) + 186(4/3) + 540(4/3) = 1166. 
Thus, for Jefferson, ABC, which represents all 925 voters, is the committee 
elected, whereas for Webster, ABD is the committee elected, which represents only 913 
voters (all except the 12 who voted for C only).  Unlike Example 1, it is Jefferson, not 
Webster, that gives the more representative outcome.  We show next that this result also 
holds for the sequential versions of each method.   
A, B, C, and D receive, respectively, 727, 726, 552, and 372 approvals.  Thus, 
under sequential Jefferson, A is the candidate elected first.  On the second round, the 
candidates’ deservingness scores are  
B: 1(0) + 12(0) + 186(0) + 186(1) + 540(1/2) = 456          
C: 1(0) + 12(1) + 186(0) + 186(0) + 540(1/2) = 282 
D: 1(0) + 12(0) + 186(1/2) + 186(1) + 540(0) = 279. 
Second-round Webster scores are 
B: 1(0) + 12(0) + 186(0) + 186(1) + 540(1/3) = 366          
C: 1(0) + 12(1) + 186(0) + 186(0) + 540(1/3) = 192 
D: 1(0) + 12(0) + 186(1/3) + 186(1) + 540(0) = 248. 
Consequently, both Jefferson and Webster elect B on the second round.  Third-round 
Jefferson scores are  
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C: 1(0) + 12(1) + 186(0) + 186(0) + 540(1/3) = 192 
D: 1(0) + 12(0) + 186(1/2) +186(1/2) + 540(0) = 186. 
Third-round Webster scores are 
C: 1(0) + 12(1) + 186(0) + 186(0) + 540(1/5) = 120 
D: 1(0) + 12(0) + 186(1/3) +186(1/3) + 540(0) = 124. 
Again, Jefferson elects ABC and Webster ABD, duplicating the nonsequential committees 
and proving that Jefferson may produce a more representative committee than Webster. 
n  
To illustrate the proof of Proposition 3 as it pertains to committees of size 2 for 
the nonsequential method, we use Example 1.  Figure 1 shows the six possible 
committees in two dimensions—the horizontal dimension is R = v1 + v2, and the vertical 
dimension is v2.  In Example 1, v1(AB) = 7 and v2(AB) = 5, so R(AB) = 12, and AB is 
plotted at (12, 5).   
 
Figure 1.  Properties (R, v2) of All Possible Committees in Example 1 
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 To visualize the maximization, observe that all six points lie on one side of the 
line J, which has slope −2. Imagine moving the line J parallel to itself so that it just 
touches one of the six points representing the committees, keeping the other five points 
on the same side.  It is clear that the committee that comes first with respect to line J is 
AB.   
For the Webster maximization, the process is the same, but the initial line, 
labelled W, has slope −3.  It is clear again that the committee that the (extended) W line 
touches first is AD, which is the most representative, i.e., has the highest value of R.  
The states in the Balinski-Young (1982/2001) model are akin to candidates in our 
model.  In the Balinski-Young model, the states receive seats based on their 
populations—as if all their residents voted for their state.  This determines how many 
seats the state receives in the U.S. House of Representatives.   
By contrast, in our model, a candidate can receive votes from any voter, and a 
voter can vote for more than one candidate.  These votes determine whether a candidate 
wins a seat on a committee, but not how many, because each candidate can win at most 
one seat.  In section 4, however, we analyze the problem of apportioning different 
numbers of seats to parties.  
4.  The Jefferson and Webster Methods Applied to Parties 
The standard applications of Jefferson and Webster are to apportion 
representatives to states, according to their populations, or seats in a legislature to 
political parties, according to the votes they receive.  Just as people can be counted as 
residents of only one state to determine its population, voters can currently vote for only 
one party.   
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Now assume that voters are not restricted to voting for one party but can approve 
of as many parties as they like.  Unlike individuals who can receive only one seat on a 
committee, parties can receive multiple seats in a legislature.   
To calculate the numbers of seats that parties receive, we assume that each party 
nominates as many candidates, s, as will be elected to the legislature.  Thus, party I 
nominates candidates i1, i2, …, is; if an apportionment method allocates k ≤ s seats to I, 
they go to candidates i1, i2, …, ik.  We assume that a voter who votes for a party approves 
of all its candidates. 
The following example illustrates how the Jefferson method would allocate seats 
to parties when voters are not restricted to voting for one party but can vote for more than 
one:  
Example 7.  2 of 6 candidates, {a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2} from parties {A, B, C} to be 
elected.  The numbers of voters who approve of different parties are 
7: AB           5: AC          2: B           3: C, 
which translates into votes for the following sets of candidates: 
7: a1a2b1b2          5: a1a2c1c2          2: b1b2          3: c1c2. 
Each of the two candidates of A, B, and C receives, respectively, 12, 9, and 8 approvals.  
Thus, candidate a1 is the first candidate elected under sequential Jefferson.  On the 
second round, deservingness scores must be compared for a2 (since a1 has already been 
elected from party A), b1 (from party B), and c1 (from party C).  We put the summations 
in the format of Example 6 but exclude from them subsets of voters who contribute 0 to a 
candidate’s approval score:   
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a2: 7(1/2) + 5(1/2) = 6;          b1: 7(1/2) + 2(1) = 5 1/2;          c1: 5(1/2) + 3(1) = 5 1/2, 
so a2 is the second candidate elected, making the winning pair a1a2.  Under nonsequential 
Jefferson, the satisfaction scores of the six possible winning pairs of candidates are 
a1a2: 7(3/2) + 5(3/2) = 18;          a1b1: 7(3/2) + 5(1) + 2(1) = 17 1/2; 
a1c1: 7(1) + 5(3/2) + 3(1) = 17 1/2;          b1b2: 7(3/2) + 2(3/2) = 13 1/2; 
b1c1: 7(1) + 5(1) + 2(1) + 3(1) = 17;          c1c2: 5(3/2) + 3(3/2) = 12, 
so again a1a2 is the winning pair.  Observe that 7 + 5 = 12 of the 17 voters are represented 
by this pair.  
By contrast, sequential Webster, after choosing a1, chooses c1 on the second 
round, because the deservingness scores are  
a2: 7(1/3) + 5(1/3) = 4;          b1: 7(1/3) + 2(1) = 4 1/3;          c1: 5(1/3) + 3(1) = 4 2/3, 
so a1c1 is the winning pair and represents all 17 voters.  Under nonsequential Webster, the 
satisfaction scores of the six pairs of candidates are  
a1a2: 7(4/3) + 5(4/3) = 16;          a1b1: 7(4/3) + 5(1) + 2(1) = 16 1/3; 
a1c1: 7(1) + 5(4/3) + 3(1) = 16 2/3;          b1b2: 7(4/3) + 2(4/3) = 12; 
b1c1: 7(1) + 5(1) + 2(1) + 3(1) = 17;          c1c2: 5(4/3) + 3(4/3) = 10 2/3, 
so b1c1 is the winning pair, which again represents all 17 voters.  
In applying apportionment methods to parties, we have assumed that more than 
one candidate can be elected from a party.  In fact, as Example 7 illustrated for Jefferson, 
all the winners may be from the same party.   
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The apportionment methods are vulnerable to manipulation.  To illustrate, 
consider the outcome, a1a2, under sequential and nonsequential Jefferson in Example 7.  
Assume that polls just before the election show that party A is a shoo-in to win one seat 
(a1) and possibly two (a1a2).  If you are one of the 5 AC voters and would prefer a 
committee of a1c1 to a1a2, you might well consider voting for just C to boost the chances 
of c1 being the second winner, making the outcome a1c1.   
More specifically, if you switch from AC to C, you increase the number of C 
voters from 3 to 4 and decrease the number of AC voters from 5 to 4.  Then the outcome 
under both sequential and nonsequential Jefferson changes from a1a2 to, respectively, a1c1 
and a tie between a1c1 and b1c1, thus producing a more diverse committee.9  Put another 
way, your sincere preference for a committee comprising members of parties A and C—
or at least a more diverse committee than a1a2—is abetted by voting for just C, 
demonstrating that sincerity is not a Nash equilibrium for Jefferson in Example 6.   
That strategic voting may be optimal is, of course, not surprising, because 
virtually all voting systems are vulnerable to manipulation.  What complicates matters in 
the case of the apportionment methods is that the determination of winners, and therefore 
optimal strategies to produce a preferred outcome, is anything but straightforward.  This 
makes it difficult to use information from polls or other sources to determine optimal 
strategic choices, especially for nonsequential versions of the apportionment methods.   
In elections for city councils and other small elected bodies in the United States, 
there are often only two parties (e.g., Democratic and Republican) or, in nonpartisan 
                                                
9 Assume one AC voter switches.  Then the deservingness value of sequential Jefferson for c1, after a1 is 
elected, is 6, which is maximal (since the score for a2 drops to 5 1/2) and makes a1c1 the outcome.  Under 
nonsequential Jefferson, the maximal satisfaction value is 17 for two outcomes, a1c1 and b1c1, both of which 
are more diverse than a1a2.   
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elections, two factions, one liberal (e.g., change oriented) and one conservative (status 
quo oriented).  Call the parties A and B, and assume that each voter votes for only one 
party.  Let the fraction of voters who support A be f, so the fraction of B supporters is 1 – 
f.   
If there are s seats to be allocated, the question that the apportionment methods 
answer is how many seats are to be received by each party.  Let k  = 1, 2, …, s.  The 
apportionment method determines thresholds t(s, k) such that party A receives k seats if 
t(s, k – 1) < f < t(s, k).10 
Recall from section 2 that the weights used in the Jefferson satisfaction function 
for electing 1, 2, 3, 4, … approved candidates are  
1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, … 
and those used in the Webster satisfaction function are 
1, 1/3, 1/5, 1/7, …. 
These sequences are equivalent to  
1/(h+0), 1/(h+1), 1/(h+2), 1/(h+3), …, 
where h = 1 for Jefferson and h = 1/2 for Webster (Proposition 4 holds for other values of 
h besides 1 and 1/2). 
Proposition 4.  Assume in a 2-party election that there are s seats to be filled, 
that each party has s candidates, and that every voter approves of every candidate of one 
                                                
10 Because f = t(s, k) for some k may be possible, a tie-breaking procedure, which we do not specify, may 
be required. 
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party (but no candidates of the other party).  Fix h > 0. In an apportionment method 
based on the weights 
1/(h+0), 1/(h+1), 1/(h+2), 1/(h+3), …. 
the thresholds for k  = 0, 1, 2, … , s − 1, are given by 
 
Proof.  We prove the proposition first for the sequential and then for the 
nonsequential method.  We assume that fN voters support party A and (1 – f)N support 
party B.  Throughout, we disregard ties. 
Sequential method.  We use mathematical induction on s.  First, the formula 
obviously holds for s = 1, since t(h, 1, 0) = 1/2 for all h and the majority party wins the 
one seat that is to be filled.  
 Now we assume that the formula holds for s and show that it holds for (s + 1).  
Our assumptions imply that the applicable value of k (𝑘 = 1, 2,… , 𝑠 − 1) satisfies 𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘 − 1 < 𝑓 < 𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘   , 
or ℎ + 𝑘 − 12ℎ + 𝑠 − 1 < 𝑓 < ℎ + 𝑘2ℎ + 𝑠 − 1 .    (1)   
Of course, k = 0 corresponds to f < t(h, s, 0) and k = s to  f > t(h, s, s – 1). 
 If party A has been awarded k out of the first s seats and (s + 1) seats are to be 
awarded in total, let k' be the number of seats out of (s + 1) to be awarded to A.  The 
deservingness of the next A candidate is greater than the deservingness of the next B 
candidate, so that the final seat will go to A (k' = k + 1), if 𝑓𝑁ℎ + 𝑘 > 1− 𝑓 𝑁ℎ + 𝑠 − 𝑘   ,      or      𝑓 > ℎ + 𝑘2ℎ + 𝑠    ; 
t h s k h k
h s
( , , ) = +
+ −2 1
 32 
but the final seat will go to B (k' = k) if 
  𝑓 < ℎ + 𝑘2ℎ + 𝑠  . 
 To complete the proof, we must show that   𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠 + 1, 𝑘′− 1 < 𝑓 < 𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠 + 1, 𝑘′ .   (2) 
If 𝑓 > !!!!"!!, then k' = k + 1, which makes (2) equivalent to  𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠 + 1, 𝑘 < 𝑓 < 𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠 + 1, 𝑘 + 1   ,      or       ℎ + 𝑘2ℎ + 𝑠 < 𝑓 < ℎ + 𝑘 + 12ℎ + 𝑠 . 
If 𝑓 < !!!!"!!, then k' = k, which makes (2) equivalent to  𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠 + 1, 𝑘 − 1 < 𝑓 < 𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠 + 1, 𝑘   ,      or       ℎ + 𝑘 − 12ℎ + 𝑠 < 𝑓 < ℎ + 𝑘2ℎ + 𝑠. 
But these results follow from (1).  For instance, because  ℎ + 𝑘 + 12ℎ + 𝑠 −    ℎ + 𝑘2ℎ + 𝑠 − 1 =    ℎ − 𝑘 + 𝑠 − 12ℎ + 𝑠 2ℎ + 𝑠 − 1  
and k ≤ s – 1, (1) implies that 𝑓 < !!!!!!"!! , completing the proof if 𝑓 > !!!!"!!.  The proof is 
similar if 𝑓 < !!!!"!!. 
Nonsequential method.  Let Y(h, s, k) denote the total representativeness score if 
the s seats were awarded to k candidates from party A and (s – k) from party B.  Because 
there are N voters,  𝑌 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘
= 𝑓𝑁 1ℎ + 0+ 1ℎ + 1+⋯+ 1ℎ + 𝑘 − 1 + 1− 𝑓 𝑁 1ℎ + 0+⋯+ 1ℎ + 𝑠 − 𝑘 − 1 . 
Let y(h, s, k) = Y(h, s, k)/N.  Then, for k = 0, 1, 2, ..., s − 1, the difference  
𝑑 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘 = 𝑦 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘 + 1 − 𝑦 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘 = 𝑓ℎ + 𝑘 − 1− 𝑓ℎ + 𝑠 − 𝑘 − 1 
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is decreasing in k, so the total score is maximized for the smallest k for which d(h, s, k) < 
0, that is, for the value of k for which d(h, s, k) < 0 < d(h, s, k − 1).  But because 
𝑑 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘 = (2ℎ + 𝑠 − 1)(ℎ + 𝑘)(ℎ + 𝑠 − 1− 𝑘) 𝑓 − ℎ + 𝑘2ℎ + 𝑠 − 1   , 
 
this double inequality is equivalent to 
 𝑓 − ℎ + 𝑘2ℎ + 𝑠 − 1 < 0 < 𝑓 − ℎ + 𝑘 − 12ℎ + 𝑠 − 1  , 
or to 
 𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘 − 1 < 𝑓 < 𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘   . 
 
This proves that, for given f, the value of k that maximizes representativeness satisfies the 
specified thresholds. n  
The thresholds for our two apportionment methods are the following: 
. 
If s = 5 and k varies from 0 to 4, these thresholds for winning 1 to 5 seats are 
Jefferson: 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 5/6;          Webster: 1/10, 3/10, 1/2, 7/10, 9/10. 
Thus, to win one seat, a party needs to win at least 1/6 of the vote under Jefferson and 
1/10 under Webster; to win all five seats requires 5/6 of the vote under Jefferson and 9/10 
under Webster.   
Evidently, the thresholds are equally spaced under Jefferson but not under 
Webster.11  At the extremes, Webster requires a relatively small fraction (1/10) to win one 
                                                
11 The thresholds under Jefferson are the same as those for cumulative voting, whereby voters can spread a 
fixed number of votes—usually equal to the number of seats to be filled on a council—to one or more 
candidates (Brams, 1975/2004, ch. 3).  The drawback of cumulative voting is that parties must determine 
Jefferson: t(1, s,k) = k +1s+1;           Webster: t(1/2, s,k) =
2k +1
2s
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seat, and a relatively large fraction (9/10) to win all five seats.  (Note, however, that 
Webster is equally spaced between the extremes—between 1 and 5 seats in the example.)   
Define the thresholds of a divisor apportionment method to be balanced in the 2-
party case if they render the attainment of an additional seat by a party independent of the 
number of seats it presently holds.  By this definition, which is only applicable to the 2-
party case, Jefferson intervals are balanced, whereas the Webster intervals, which make 
attaining the first seat “easy” and the last seat “hard,” are not.12 
Define the quota qi of party i as the fraction fi of the vote it receives times the 
number of seats, s, to be apportioned: qi = fis.  For example, if there are 5 seats on a 
council, the quota of a party that receives 32% of the vote is 0.32 × 5 = 1.6.  That is, this 
party is “entitled” to exactly 1.6 seats.   
A party’s number of seats of seats must be an integer, so it is said to receive quota 
if its number of seats equals its quota, rounded up or down.  From the thresholds we gave 
above for a 5-seat council, Jefferson would give this party one seat (because 0.32 is less 
than 1/3), but Webster would give it two seats (because 0.32 is greater than 3/10).  As this 
example illustrates in the 2-party case, Webster favors the smaller party, Jefferson the 
larger party (68% gives it a quota of 3.4, so it would obtain four seats under Jefferson but 
only three seats under Webster).     
                                                                                                                                            
how many candidates to run to ensure that their supporters do not spread their votes too thinly across too 
many candidates, thereby preventing the party’s proportional representation on the council.  As we noted 
earlier, the apportionment methods allow the parties to nominate a full slate of candidates, because they 
give decreasing weight to the election of additional approved candidates.  This builds proportional 
representation into the apportionment method (i.e., without the necessity of strategizing about how many 
candidates to run), though what is considered “proportional” depends on the method (Jefferson or Webster) 
used.      
12 For other justifications of Jefferson, see Brill, Laslier, and Skowron (2016) and references therein.  Brill, 
Freeman, ,Janson, and Lackner (2017) analyze “lead-balancing” approaches that have similar justifications. 
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An apportionment method satisfies quota if every party always receives quota.  If 
s = 1, it is clear that any method of allocating seats satisfies quota.  If s ≥ 2, satisfaction of 
quota (disregarding ties) means  𝑘𝑠 < 𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘 < 𝑘 + 1𝑠   ,     
or                 𝑘𝑠 <    ℎ + 𝑘2ℎ + 𝑠 − 1 < 𝑘 + 1𝑠                    𝑘 = 0, 1, 2,… , 𝑠 − 1   . 
Proposition 5 proves that, for the same 2-party case to which Proposition 4 pertains, the 
thresholds t(s, h, k) satisfy quota provided that a simple condition on h holds when s > 2. 
Note that ties are again disregarded in the proof.   
Proposition 5.13  If there are two parties, s ≥ 2, and the context is the same as in 
Proposition 4, then quota is satisfied for all positive values of h if s = 2, or, if s > 2, for 
any positive value of h <  !!!!!!. 
Proof.  Because of the relation t(h, s, k) + t(h, s, s − k – 1) = 1, we need consider 
only values of k satisfying k ≤ s/2.  First, it is immediate that    
𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑠 = 𝑘 + ℎ 𝑠 − 2𝑘𝑠 2ℎ + 𝑠 − 1 > 0           
since k and s – 2k  are non-negative and cannot both be zero.  Also,  𝑘 + 1𝑠 − 𝑡 ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑘 = 𝑘 2ℎ − 1 + 𝑠 − 1 − ℎ 𝑠 − 2𝑠 2ℎ + 𝑠 − 1  
and we can complete the proof by showing that the numerator of the fraction on the right 
is positive.  Now if h ≥ ½, then 2h – 1 ≥ 0, so the numerator cannot be less than  
𝑠 − 1 − ℎ 𝑠 − 2   > 0    if    ℎ < 𝑠 − 1𝑠 − 2. 
                                                
13 Special cases to which this proposition applies are for the weights of Jefferson (h = 1), Webster (h = 1/2), 
and Adams (h approaches 0). 
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Thus, the fraction is positive under this condition.  To see that the same conclusion holds 
if h < ½, note that the numerator is decreasing in k, so its minimum, attained at k = s/2, 
equals 
s
2 (2h−1)+ (s−1)− h(s− 2) = 2h+
(s− 2)
2 > 0.n 
Observe that, at the extreme value h = !!!!!!  , we have 𝑡 !!!!!! , 𝑠, 0 = !!  and 𝑡 !!!!!! , 𝑠, 𝑠 −1 = !!!! , so both of these thresholds fall exactly on the quota boundaries. It follows that 
the bound on h cannot be improved. 
If there are more than two parties, Proposition 5 is no longer true (Balinski and 
Young, 1982/2001).  Nondivisor methods of apportionment (e.g., that of Hamilton) 
always satisfy quota, but they are subject to certain nonmonotonicity problems—for 
example, the Alabama paradox, whereby the apportionment of a party may decrease 
when the number of seats in a legislature increases (Balinski and Young, 1982/2001).  It 
is possible, however, to marry Hamilton with Jefferson or Webster—or any of the other 
three divisor methods—and satisfy quota and avoid most paradoxes (Potthoff, 2014).    
Balinski and Young advocate Webster in the apportionment of representatives to 
states, because it is least biased, showing no systematic tendency to favor some states, 
and it almost always satisfies quota.  But in the apportionment of seats to parties in a 
legislature, they advocate Jefferson, because it discourages small parties.   
Under Jefferson, a small party may win no seats, even when it would win one 
under Webster.  This gives small parties a greater incentive to merge under Jefferson in 
order better to ensure that they win some seats.  With its greater tendency to inhibit the 
fractionalization of parliaments into many small parties, Jefferson also facilitates the 
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formation of a governing coalition comprising a few large parties (e.g., center-left or 
center-right) that together hold a majority of seats.      
We believe that both Jefferson and Webster are likely to foster more cooperation 
among political parties if voters can approve of more than one party.  In effect, voters 
would be able to support coalitions of parties that they prefer in a governing coalition 
rather than being restricted to singling out one party for exclusive support.  To be sure, 
some voters will prefer to throw all their support to one party if they consider it the only 
party with which they have an ideological affinity, but other voters are likely to find more 
than one party—perhaps for different reasons—compatible with their views.   
5.  Conclusions 
Extending approval voting to the election of multiple winners can create a tyranny 
of the majority.  A majority faction or party can win all the seats on a committee or in a 
legislature, or at least a disproportionate number of them, giving little or no voice to the 
views of minorities.  
By depreciating the approval votes of voters who have one or more of their 
approved candidates elected, apportionment methods enable different individuals or 
groups to gain representation, and the resulting voting body to reflect a wider range of 
viewpoints.  We focused on two well-known divisor methods of apportionment, first 
proposed by Jefferson and Webster, for depreciating approval votes in determining the 
winners in a multiwinner approval election. 
We distinguished sequential and nonsequential versions of each method.  The 
sequential versions are widely used today, both in apportioning representatives to states 
and apportioning seats to political parties in a legislature.  Either version may elect a 
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more representative voting body, whose members are approved of by more voters, but the 
nonsequential version is more likely to maximize representativeness when the two 
methods differ.    
Nonsequential versions of the Jefferson and Webster methods are computationally 
complex, which is perhaps why neither is presently used in any jurisdictions.  But modern 
computers mitigate this problem, rendering them feasible for many elections.  The fact 
that sequential and nonsequential versions of each method can produce nonoverlapping 
sets of winners shows that their impact on who is elected may be decidedly nontrivial. 
But the fact that the different sets of winners produced by each version tend to have very 
similar deservingness and satisfaction scores makes the choice of one or the other less 
consequential. 
Although the apportionment methods are vulnerable to manipulation, determining 
optimal manipulative strategies appears hard.  The Jefferson method, which has the same 
vote thresholds as cumulative voting for winning seats on a council, eliminates the need 
for a party to strategize about the number of candidates to run to ensure its proportional 
representation, as also does the Webster method (but with different thresholds).     
In 2-party competition, the vote thresholds for winning are evenly spaced by 
Jefferson but not by Webster, making the former balanced.  On the other hand, if there is 
no restriction on the number of parties and the methods produce different winners, more 
voters will tend to approve of the Webster winners than the Jefferson winners, making 
them more representative. 
It seems fitting that in electing multiple winners, voters, using approval ballots, 
should be able to approve of multiple candidates or parties.  This enhanced ability of 
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voters to express themselves seems likely to foster more cooperation across ideological 
and party lines, attenuating the oft-observed gridlock in many elected voting bodies 
today.14  
    
                                                
14 Partisan gerrymanders, for seats both in state legislatures and in the U.S. House of Representatives, may 
not survive current U.S. Supreme Court challenges to their constitutionality (Grofman, 2017).  As a 
remedy, multiwinner elections would seem attractive as a way to combat gerrymandering, although at the 
federal level their implementation would require repeal of the 1967 ban on multimember congressional 
districts.    
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